Many philosophers believe that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren't unified under non-evaluative similarity relations and that this "shapelessness thesis" (ST) has significant metaethical implications regarding non-cognitivism, ethical naturalism, moral particularism, thick concepts and more. ST is typically offered as an explanation of why evaluative classifications appear to "outrun" classifications specifiable in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms. This paper argues that both ST and the outrunning point used to motivate it can be explained on the basis of more general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative.
Introduction
Many philosophers believe that the evaluative is "shapeless" with respect to the non-evaluative. What they mean by this shapelessness thesis is roughly that the extensions of evaluative predicates or concepts aren't unified under nonevaluative similarity relations. This idea is recruited to do significant work in a number of metaethical contexts. The shapelessness thesis is supposed to undermine non-cognitivism. 1 It is supposed to undermine at least reductive naturalism in ethics. 2 It is supposed to illuminate the nature of such "thick" terms and concepts as selfish or courageous. 3 More recently it is also claimed to imply moral particularism and the "holism" of reasons and value. 4 Yet the shapelessness thesis itself went long without sustained attention and clarification -until recently. 5 The main argument of this paper is that the notion of shapelessness operative in these discussions neither is characteristic of the evaluative in particular nor (partly for that reason) supports the sorts of significant metaethical implications that tend to get attributed to it. The phenomena that are used to support the non-evaluative shapelessness of the evaluative can be explained on the basis of factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative and have no distinctive metaethical implications. After responding to an objection and explaining why my argument is robust across certain complications, I conclude by explaining how my main argument challenges certain claims about the implications of shapelessness regarding thick terms and concepts and bears on what notions count as evaluative in the first place. 6
1 McDowell (1981) , Williams (1985, 140-1) , McNaughton (1988, 60-2) , Hurley (1989, 13) , tive terms or concepts are "shapely" in the sense that they "correspond to kinds into which things can in principle be seen to fall independently of an evaluative outlook" (McDowell 1981, 216) . The "shape" of a concept may here be understood as the real similarity between all and only the things that fall under it (Roberts 2011, 505) . So what the shapelessness thesis says generically is that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts have an evaluative shape but whereas concepts are such meanings.) Such an assumption may be a significant simplification.
Following along with it will, however, be largely harmless here.
7 See McDowell (1981, 202, 216) and Blackburn (1981, 167) . 8 I'll leave to one side various complications about this passage, such as whether the notion of supervenience with which McDowell operates is supposed to be global or local, ontological or ascriptive and so on.
no non-evaluative shape. This is meant to be an in-principle point about evaluative classifications, not merely a point about contingent expressive limitations of our non-evaluative language. I'll assume that the point is consistent with the plausible idea that a "non-evaluative" relation is best characterized as one that can be ascribed in purely non-evaluative terms. I'll also assume that the relevant notion of extension is the set of all actual and possible things to which a predicate correctly applies. Otherwise shapelessness will be cut off from such items as properties.
The idea that the evaluative is non-evaluatively shapeless in this sort of sense garners wide sympathy. 9 Its appearance in a number of metaethical contexts is unsurprising. For although McDowell asks us to consider as an example "a specific conception of some moral virtue" (1981, 201) , it is clear from context that his discussion is meant to apply not only to thick terms and concepts (such as cruel, generous or tactful ) but to the evaluative in general, including thin terms and concepts (such as intrinsically good or morally wrong). 10 For McDowell is concerned with "whether, corresponding to any value concept, one can always isolate . . . a feature that is there . . . independently of anyone's value experience being as it is" and whether ascriptions of value can accordingly be "disentangled" into two distinct components of sensitivity to a non-evaluative aspect of the world plus an attitude or sentiment that constitutes the experience of value (McDowell 1981, 200-1; cf. 1981, 216) . 11 9 See McDowell (1981) , McNaughton (1988, 60-2) , Hurley (1989, 13) , Dancy (1993, 84-6; 1995) , Wiggins (1993) , Little (2000) , Kirchin (2010) , and Roberts (2011) . 10 I'll use italics to denote both terms and concepts (recall note 6 above) and capital letters to denote properties. I'll follow my opponents in writing as if thick terms and concepts are evaluative in meaning or content until §7 where I suggest that nothing in considerations of shapelessness supports this assumption. 11 McDowell is here talking about the evaluative in general despite his example of virtue terms;
see Lang (2001, 197) and Roberts (2011, 503) . As Roberts notes, this notion of disentangling must be distinguished from the notion that comes into play when we ask whether thick terms and concepts can be understood in terms of distinct non-evaluative and thin evaluative content; on this latter issue, see e.g. Williams (1985, 140-1) , Blackburn (1992) , Dancy (1995) and Elstein and Hurka (2009) .
The shapelessness relation may be understood in many different ways when it comes to the semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological features of the relation and its (fundamental) relata. Is it evaluative terms, concepts or properties that are shapeless (or shapely), and are they supposed to be shapeless relative to nonevaluative terms, concepts or properties? And, whatever the relata may be, is the relationship itself a semantic or conceptual matter, or a matter of metaphysics which might have no reflection at the level of language or concepts? Similarly, is the relationship supposed to be knowable through reflection on concepts or some other general a priori method, or only through substantive evaluative theorizing (be this a priori or not)? It is often unclear just how the notion of shapelessness is supposed to be understood in these respects. 12
A crucial question about the interpretation of the shapelessness thesis concerns the relationship between evaluative terms and concepts and the nonevaluative classifications to which their extensions would correspond if the shapelessness thesis were false. Does the shapelessness thesis say merely that no such non-evaluative classifications are built into the meanings of evaluative terms or concepts? This is the reading we get from McDowell's claim that understanding why certain non-evaluatively described items belong together may require understanding an evaluative term if the relevant notion of understanding an evaluative term is a matter of grasping its sense. Or does the shapelessness thesis say more strongly that evaluative terms and concepts have no non-evaluative shapes at all? This is the reading we get if the relevant notion of understanding an evaluative term requires not merely grasping its sense but also some further not merely conceptual competence. 13 While the former option is perhaps a more natural way to interpret "understanding a term" and the reasoning that McDowell him-
12
The semantic and epistemological features of the relation are unclear in McDowell (1981, 200-2) and Dancy (1993, 76, 85) . Its fundamental relata are unclear in Little (2000, 279) . Some of these choice points, and some of the available options, are registered and discussed by Miller (2003, 250-4) , Kirchin (2010) and Roberts (2011) . 13 This distinction is closely related to the distinction between "intensional" and "extensional" readings of shapelessness and its negation in Miller (2003, 252-3) . Both Miller and Lang (2001, 203-4) argue that McDowell conflates this distinction.
self deploys, the latter option fits better with the possibility that two thinkers who grasp the same sense can assign it different extensions and thereby disagree about its correct extension. These readings are thus distinct: while grasping the sense of an evaluative term is plausibly necessary for grasping its extension, the latter cannot in general be part of what explains the former. 14 Conceptually competent speakers can in general be wrong about the correct extensions;
evaluative terms and concepts are no exception.
We can use the broader metaethical context to guide our interpretation of the shapelessness thesis. If the thesis were taken in the former way, as denying only that grasping the sense of an evaluative predicate provides access to a kind recognizable as such at the non-evaluative level, then it would fail to threaten non-cognitivism about evaluative judgment in the way it is sometimes claimed to do. 15 Non-cognitivists needn't claim that the connection between non-evaluative and evaluative qualities is conceptual or fixed by linguistic convention; as Simon
Blackburn puts it, "to tell which moral quality results from a given natural state means using standards whose correctness cannot be shown by conceptual means alone. It means moralizing, and bad people moralize badly, but need not be confused" (Blackburn 1984, 184) . Interpreting shapelessness merely as a thesis about the meanings of evaluative predicates would similarly have no bite against reductive evaluative naturalism according to which evaluative terms (such as intrinsically good ) ascribe properties that can also be ascribed in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms (such as pleasant, in the crude case of metaethical hedonism) but this property identity is a synthetic truth knowable only a
posteriori. Yet the shapelessness thesis is typically presented as incompatible 14 If grasping a concept or the sense of an expression cannot plausibly be a matter of grasping its extension, then by Kirchin's own lights his whole line of argument in favor of shapelessness is wrong (Kirchin 2010, 25 Miller (2003, 250, 253) and Roberts (2011, 505-6) . 17 ST should be distinguished from a yet different thesis, one that drops any reference to items like predicates and concepts and instead concerns properties on both sides of the shapelessness relation. This property-property notion of shapelessness generates the claim that evaluative properties (not predicates or concepts) are such that all the actual and possible things that bear a given evaluative property aren't unified under any non-evaluative relation of real similarity. The difference between this purely metaphysical shapelessness thesis and the shapelessness thesis I'll be focusing on is that the set of things which the purely metaphysical thesis is about needn't be the extension of any evaluative predicate or concept, so long as it corresponds to a property. Whether this distinction makes for a robust difference regarding the putative metaethical implications of shapelessness depends on further issues. For instance, is the connec-What a positive argument for ST would look like is unclear. This may be partly because shapelessness is characterized as a feature of extension and reference-fixing for evaluative terms is generally a controversial and murky issue in metaethics. But several potential avenues of argument are quickly ruled out.
ST is supposed be an in-principle claim that won't follow simply if evaluative classifications correspond only to non-evaluative patterns that are too complex to be captured in language or thought. Nor does ST follow from the view that the evaluative is autonomous with respect to the non-evaluative in the sense that there is no reasonable inference from purely non-evaluative premises to any evaluative conclusion. Nor does it follow from non-naturalism in metaethics.
Non-naturalists can hold, for instance, that all and only intrinsically good things increase utility (where utility is defined in non-evaluative terms), so long as they don't identify one with the other; this would be to say that intrinsic goodness has a non-evaluative shape. 18 And although ST would seem to follow from any response-dependence view of evaluative concepts or properties on which the responses and conditions which determine extension cannot be characterized in purely non-evaluative terms, it is ST rather than the response-dependence account that is the less controversial of the two. 19 Nor do we find any direct argution between properties and extensions close enough for the distinction to make little difference?
Is non-evaluative property or relation best understood as a property or relation that can be ascribed in non-evaluative terms, so that a reference to something conceptual or linguistic is required after all? However these chips may fall, I'll set aside the purely metaphysical thesis in this paper because the discussions of the shapelessness thesis that can be found in the literature tend to characterize it explicitly as a claim about the extensions or correct applications of evaluative predicates or concepts, just as ST has it. See McDowell (1981, 200-2) , Dancy (1993, 76, 85) , Kirchin (2010, 7, 12) and Roberts (2011, 505-6) .
18 Among non-naturalists, G. E. Moore allows this as a possibility (Moore 1903, §6) . Also note that (non-reductive) evaluative naturalism is compatible with ST. Properties ascribed by using evaluative terms can be natural even if they cannot be ascribed also by using non-evaluative terms (Sturgeon 2003) . 19 For the relevant kind of response-dependence account, often called "sensibility theory", see McDowell (1985) and Wiggins (1993) .
ment for ST in the literature. 20 McDowell claims only to be removing a "prejudice" against the non-evaluative shapelessness of the evaluative, not giving a positive argument for it, when he argues that it isn't ruled out by supervenience.
Whatever the argument for ST might be, the strongest conclusion that I have seen explicitly advocated (rather than merely suggested) is the epistemic possibility claim that the evaluative is non-evaluatively shapeless for all we know (Kirchin 2010, 19 Those considerations may support the idea that evaluative terms and concepts cannot be attributed a non-evaluative shape simply on the basis of conceptual or other general a priori reflection. As noted earlier, however, this falls short of ST (Miller 2003, 253) . In a discussion of the role of rule-following considerations in metaethics, Lang (2001) argues that such considerations don't support the view that the extensions of evaluative terms are essentially uncodifiable.
implications in these other domains.
To illustrate this prospect, consider that one might hold that the classifications drawn by mental or psychological terms aren't unified under nonpsychological similarity relations. 21 I suppose it may be true, for all I know, that the extensions of such psychological terms as pain or belief aren't unified under non-psychological similarity relations. Or false for all I know. But either way the shapelessness of the mental would seem to lack significant consequences in philosophy of mind which would be distinctive to shapelessness. The shapelessness of the mental doesn't rule out non-reductive physicalism about the mental because it is compatible with functionalism and anomalous monism, which don't entail physicalism but are compatible with it. 22 Shapelessness of the mental is compatible with functionalism because it is compatible with the multiple realizability of the mental by a variety of physical media; multiple realizability allows that these physical media have in common nothing other than a capacity to support a distinctive functional profile (Fodor 1974; Block 1980) . And it is compatible with anomalous monism because anomalous monism claims that there are no strict psychophysical laws but every token mental event is token-identical to some physical event; this is compatible with a lack of real non-psychological similarity among the physical token events that are identical to different tokens of the given type of mental event (Davidson 1970) . Nor would the shapelessness of the mental open up any distinctive "explanatory gap" between the mental and the physical, be required to explain why mental events cannot be explained solely by physical events without auxiliary assumptions concerning the relation between the mental and the physical or rule out non-strict psychophysical laws.
If the shapelessness of the mental lacks distinctive significant implications in philosophy of mind, one begins to wonder why it should nonetheless have such implications in metaethics. The sentiment grows stronger once we notice 21 For a sympathetic discussion of this sort of idea, see Child (1993) . 22 Although the falsity of reductive physicalism would be a significant consequence, I doubt that shapelessness provides the best, let alone the only, route to it. But I acknowledge that my move in this paragraph may not move those physicalists whom the shapelessness of the mental would make really nervous. 
Shapelessness and Outrunning
Why is the shapelessness of the evaluative supposed to be attractive in the first place? Consider the following motivations for it, in addition to the passage 23 Nor would shapelessness rule out the existence of certain kinds of non-strict or hedged moral principles. One can deny moral particularism and yet hold that evaluative properties tend to figure in multiple different non-strict principles, such as 'All else equal, N1s are Es', 'All else equal, N2s are Es' etc. (where Ni is a non-evaluative property and E the target evaluative property) such that N1, N2, . . ., Nn aren't unified under real non-evaluative similarity.
Therefore I doubt that Roberts (2011) is right that the shapelessness of the evaluative supports moral particularism. 24 Simon Kirchin claims that shapelessness is characteristic of the evaluative in particular (Kirchin 2010, 16 (Roberts 2011, 506.) These statements seem to be aimed at motivating ST as a good explanation of a certain phenomenon. The phenomenon is that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts seem to "outrun" (as Kirchin puts it) non-evaluative classifications.
Whether a particular item falls under a given evaluative term or concept E cannot be reliably projected just from the non-evaluative features of the other instances of E, without an understanding of E. ST is supposed to provide a good explanation of this "outrunning point". 25 A significant complication arises immediately. Earlier we distinguished two versions of the shapelessness thesis. The weaker, less interesting version says that the meanings of evaluative terms and concepts don't have built into them nonevaluative similarity relations that would unify their extensions. The stronger, more interesting version laid out in ST says that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren't unified under non-evaluative similarity relations, irrespective of whether these were supposed to be built into the meanings of evaluative terms or concepts. We also saw that these two options correlate with two different notions of understanding a term -grasping its sense, and some notion stronger than such conceptual competence. To which option does the outrunning point correspond?
If understanding a term is a matter of grasping its sense, then the outrunning point says that whether a particular item falls under a given evaluative term or concept E cannot be reliably projected just from the non-evaluative features of the other instances of E, without having a grasp of the sense of E. This sort of claim might be fairly natural to read into the quotes from McDowell and Little.
But this version of the outrunning point can be used to motivate at most the less interesting version of the shapelessness thesis. The stronger, more interesting version of the shapelessness thesis laid out in ST is simply not needed to explain this version of the outrunning point. 26 By the same token, if the outrunning point is read in this weak way, then the conclusion that the outrunning point provides no support for the sorts of metaethical implications that get attributed to ST will be relatively uninteresting.
25 It is unclear whether the outrunning point is to be understood as (merely) an epistemic claim or more strongly, such as some kind of constitutive claim. Locutions such as "there is no way of saying..." and "cannot be specified..." can be read either way. I hope my discussion to get by without speculation on this score. 26 Thanks to the anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me on this point.
The outrunning point can, however, be given a stronger, more interesting interpretation. Kirchin's central claim is that the extension of kind is sensitive to potentially indefinite variation in the non-evaluative features relevant to kindness. Roberts appeals to certain conditions for learning the extension of a concept beyond the condition that grasping its sense is necessary for grasping its extension. Neither seems to make any fundamental appeal to a specifically conceptual competence in articulating the outrunning point. A stronger version of the outrunning point would therefore say that whether a particular item falls under a given evaluative term or concept E cannot be reliably projected just from the non-evaluative features of the other instances of E, irrespective of whether these are built into the meaning of E or uncovered through some not merely conceptual inquiry.
Another complication is that the notion of extension relevant to ST is correct extension but the outrunning point is often characterized in terms of the set of things to which some group of competent users believe the relevant term to apply. Both McDowell and Roberts claim that "outsiders" to some evaluative practice who don't possess a given evaluative concept or try to engage with the evaluative concerns reflected in the concept won't be able reliably to track how competent "insiders" would apply the term. But insiders can be mistaken in their beliefs about the term's extension. I'll assume, for reasons of charity, that the cases under discussion are those special cases where insiders have got the extension right. 27
To grant the outrunning point, on this interpretation, is to grant that one cannot reliably track whether some prospective cases fall under a predicate like morally good or cruel just on the basis of its other instances, as described without information provided by a grasp of its sense or some more substantive inquiry in which the predicate is deployed. Even if a person without such information 27 This is to assume that the stronger outrunning point articulated above can be got off the ground even in cases where someone grasps the sense of a predicate but has an incorrect view of its extension. It seems to me that if the outrunning point is plausible in the case of "outsiders", it should be plausible in this case, too. The writers who raise the outrunning point seem to differ as to whether it is characteristic of the evaluative in particular. Some of them think it is. Kirchin, for instance, writes: "Indeed, we are assuming that ethical concepts are special concepts where outrunning occurs, as opposed to other concepts -such as 'is a monarch' -where one might assume this does not happen" (Kirchin 2010, 16) .
Others suggest that evaluative terms and concepts aren't unique in this respect, but are nonetheless paradigmatic examples of a special class of "interest-relative"
concepts "whose point is given by some human interest or concern" and whose extensions cannot be grasped without engaging with those concerns (Dancy 1993, 76; cf. McDowell 1981 and Wiggins 1993 My suggestion is that the outrunning phenomenon seems more general still.
The outrunning phenomenon can be got going with respect to a term or concept T already if the extension of T isn't unified under any similarity relation expressible without T or, as I'll say, expressible in independently intelligible T -free terms. This might happen even if T isn't an evaluative or interestrelative term or concept. One very general view that would deliver this result is that natural language expressions cannot generally be analyzed or understood in terms of independently intelligible necessary and sufficient conditions. Just consider the notorious difficulties of analyzing even horse or red in such terms.
The present point might be simply a local instance of this very general idea.
28 My formulation here borrows freely from Sreenivasan (2001, 19) .
A less overarching and more concrete way to make the same point is to consider other examples. Thus, for instance, specifying the extension of a psychological term like painful seems to require an understanding of painful and thus seems like a good candidate for outrunning independently intelligible painful -free
descriptions. Yet painful isn't an evaluative term. Nor does it seem to reflect any specifically human interest or concern. But if there is doubt as to whether psychological terms are interest-relative in this sense, note that some biological terms or concepts can also exemplify outrunning. The foregoing suggests that the outrunning point is a fairly broad phenomenon that is explicable on the basis of fairly general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being interest-relative or evaluative. Thus even if there is no way of saying what the various ways of being cruel have in common without helping ourselves to information described using cruel, there is no reason why this should have anything in particular to do with whether cruel is an evaluative or interest-relative term. If cruel is such a term, then it specifies an evaluative (or interest-relative) shape which isn't unified under non-evaluative similarity relations according to ST. All that is required to explain outrunning, however, is that the extension of cruel cannot be expressed in independently intelligible cruel -free terms. That is independent of whether cruel is an eval- Although I have illustrated my argument with the thick term cruel, the basic idea works the same with respect to thin evaluative terms such as wrong or morally good. Philosophers hold different views concerning whether some thin concepts are to be analyzed in terms of others, and if so, which are to be analyzed in terms of which. All the same it is widely thought that if some evaluative terms are more basic than others, then the basic ones outrun the descriptions or classifications that can be drawn without deploying those terms.
The intuition here is that there is no entry to evaluative distinctions without some grasp of notions that are basic to those distinctions. This implies some claims of the form taken by the claim that morally good outruns descriptions or classifications drawn in morally good -free terms. But again the outrunning point as such can be explained without any reference to whether morally good is an evaluative term. Although most of us think, of course that wrong and morally good are evaluative terms, the outrunning point arises irrespective of this fact.
The proponents of ST seem thus to misjudge the implications of the outrunning point they present as motivating ST. What the outrunning point regarding some term or concept T shows is at most that the extension of T or the conditions for falling under it cannot be captured in T -free terms. That shows at most that T-hood (the property to which T refers) isn't reducible to something non-29 Skepticism about such descriptive equivalence in the case of thick terms and concepts is well formulated by Sreenivasan (2001, 19) . See also Sturgeon (2003) and Elstein and Hurka (2009) . 30 This is intended to contrast with the remarks on tactful in Roberts (2011, 519 This completes my main argument for the claim that the outrunning point that is commonly used to motivate ST can be explained by more general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. The outrunning point thus fails to support taking shapelessness to be characteristic of the evaluative in particular or attributing to ST the sorts of metaethical implications that get attributed to it. We have yet to see a notion of shapelessness that is 31 I say 'at most' because this upshot seems to require taking the outrunning point as an in-principle point that doesn't merely reflect the expressive limitations of language. My own preference would be to treat reduction as a relation between items like properties which may hold as a matter of a necessary synthetic a posteriori truth.
32 See e.g. Gibbard (2003, 88-102) for this kind of view.
33 See e.g. Railton (1986) for this kind of reductive naturalism in ethics.
plausibly characteristic of the evaluative in particular. 34
A Quietist Shuffle?
One the "character" of an expression (Kaplan 1989) . 38 Let me forestall some potential misunderstandings. The semantic value of a contextsensitive term relative to context can be an intrinsic property, such as height in the case of tall ). Moreover, which intrinsic property it will be needn't depend on a comparison with a comparison class of other individuals; for instance, one can count as heavy, or tall, relative to the maximum safety limit for a rollercoaster.
evaluative terms in general. 39 Shapelessness and outrunning must thus be understood as features of extension relative to context.
A lot more could be said about how shapelessness and outrunning are related to context-sensitivity. But most of this would be tangential to my main argument, so let me simply note that invoking context-sensitivity isn't meant to suggest that outrunning or shapelessness are nothing but manifestations of context-sensitivity. 40 It is rather to acknowledge a potential objection. A sophis-39 One might claim that according to McDowell, mastery of evaluative concepts requires a sensitivity to evaluative features which is a form of sensitivity to context. Now determining whether something falls under an evaluative term E may well require a sensitivity; perhaps one needs to appreciate that some things are E in virtue of being P, other things are E in virtue of being Q & R, something that is P may not be E if it is also S and so on. But this may be true even if E is a context-invariant term. It is quite another thing to say that the standard for E-ness itself varies with context. McDowell incorporates the former point, but not the latter. 40 Let me nonetheless note that some natural objections to using context-sensitivity to explain outrunning or shapelessness are weaker than they might seem. One might object that the comparatives of evaluative terms (e.g. morally better than or more courageous than) exhibit Jamie Dreier.) However, the comparatives of "multidimensional" gradable terms (e.g. more painful than or balder than) are context-sensitive because the different dimensions (e.g. intensity and duration in the case of painful ) may get weighted differently in different contexts and thus yield different extensions (Benbaji 2009; van Rooij 2011) . But since a wide range of evaluative terms (e.g. courageous, and perhaps morally good ) are also multidimensional in this sense, their comparatives will similarly be context-sensitive; this narrows down the range of potential context-insensitive evaluative predicates. For instance, impartiality may be highly relevant to what counts as morally good in allocation of public resources but much less relevant in the context of special relationships. So context-sensitivity could after all be used to explain why the comparatives of these evaluative terms exhibit outrunning and shapelessness insofar as they do so. But the explanation has nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. See
Väyrynen (forthcoming) for discussion. The only point I'll argue below in the text is that when an evaluative term isn't multidimensional, it is much harder to show that its extension relative to context is shapeless or exhibits outrunning. There is probably no a priori argument to show whether the extensions relative to context of any evaluative terms are left over as non-evaluatively shapeless once the issue just discussed is settled. It is therefore important to show that my main line of argument from §4 would apply with equal force to context-sensitive terms. The claim to show is that the outrunning point can be got going even regarding extension relative to context already if the extension isn't unified under any similarity relation expressible without the target term, and that this has nothing to do with being evaluative in particular.
Suppose that there is no way of saying what the various different ways of counting as cruel relative to context have in common without helping ourselves to our understanding of cruelty. All this shows is that the extension of cruel relative to context cannot be specified in cruel -free terms, and this has nothing to do with being evaluative in particular. If cruel is evaluative in meaning, then its extension relative to context has an evaluative shape which (if ST is true) corresponds to no classification specifiable in independently intelligible nonevaluative terms -but these would be cruel -free terms. If cruel isn't evaluative in meaning, then its extension relative to context is unified under the non-evaluative similarity relation of counting as cruel -but whether there is any independently intelligible cruel -free way to specify that non-evaluative shape is, again, simply a further issue. And again the argument works the same with respect to thin evaluative terms. If the extension of morally good relative to context outruns descriptions given in morally good -free terms, this can be explained by noting that many a term T, evaluative or otherwise, is such that its extension relative to context cannot be unified by similarity relations describable in T -free terms. 45
Nothing about being evaluative need come into it. Explaining such phenomena doesn't therefore require invoking any putative characteristic of the evaluative in particular. It is thus doubtful that shapelessness or outrunning, understood as features of extension relative to context, support the sorts of metaethical implications that tend to get attributed to ST.
Conclusion
In this paper I have done three things. I clarified the thesis that the extensions of evaluative terms are non-evaluatively shapeless and noted that the thesis is typically motivated by appeal to the outrunning point. I argued that neither the shapelessness thesis nor the outrunning point are characteristic of the evaluative in particular because both can be explained by more general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative, and that the argument is robust across complications that arise from the context-sensitivity of many evaluative terms. And I argued that if shapelessness isn't characteristic of the evaluative in particular, we shouldn't expect it to carry the sorts of distinctive metaethical implications that tend to get attributed to it.
I'll conclude by considering briefly how my argument bears on thick terms and concepts in ethics, such as cruel, selfish, courageous and generous. ST has been invoked to argue that the evaluative and non-evaluative aspects of thick terms and concepts aren't separable. 46 This argument is increasingly recognized to be ineffective: the "inseparabilist" can accept ST but hold that the extensions of thick terms and concepts are partly determined by evaluation and partly by distinct non-evaluative description. 47 At stake in this debate is the larger issue 45 My earlier examples of painful and terms standing for morphological concepts in biology would seem to carry over. If these terms aren't context-sensitive, their extension relative to context will be the same in every context, so they can be treated as a limiting case.
46 See e.g. Williams (1985, 140-1) and Dancy (1995) . Contrary to a common assumption, this argument isn't found in McDowell (1981) . His notion of "disentangling" is meant to apply to evaluative terms and concepts across the board; see the text surrounding note 11 above).
47 See e.g. Elstein and Hurka (2009) and Roberts (2011) .
whether the meanings of thick terms and concepts can be understood reductively as some combination of non-evaluative description plus thin evaluation (such as good for its own sake or right) or whether the evaluative character of thick terms and concepts is somehow irreducibly thick. 48
The debate just described assumes that thick terms and concepts are evaluative in meaning and focuses on disputing the more specific sense or way in which they are evaluative, in part by reference to what the non-evaluative shapelessness of thick terms and concepts would show in this respect. 49 What my argument implies is that this way of framing the debate cannot be justified by considerations of shapelessness, and indeed that my terminological convenience of writing throughout the paper as if thick terms and concepts fell into the category of evaluative ones is controversial. For if shapelessness isn't characteristic of the evaluative in particular, then thick terms and concepts could well be shapeless, in the sense that their extensions relative to context aren't unified under similarity relations specifiable in "thickness-free" terms, even if they weren't evaluative in meaning. All this applies to the outrunning point. Treating any particular notion as evaluative in meaning requires support that is independent of the outrunning point or ST. We should therefore focus on settling whether thick terms and concepts are evaluative in meaning before considering whether ST tells us anything interesting about them. It is an open possibility that careful attention to whether it is coherent to grant that something is selfish (lustful, lazy, courageous, generous and so on) but suspect the presumption that it is thereby bad (or good) in any particular way will show that thick terms and concepts aren't evaluative in meaning. 50 In that case ST wouldn't even apply to thick terms and concepts; they would rather be closer to the non-evaluative instances of the 48 See Elstein and Hurka (2009), Kirchin (2010) , Roberts (2011) and Parfit (2011, 315-23) . 49 I mean 'evaluative in meaning' in the sense that, for instance, A is selfish entails, as a conceptual or semantic matter, that A is bad in a certain sort of way (where the particular way of being bad may or may not be analyzable in thin evaluative terms). See Väyrynen (2012) for a further elaboration. 50 I discuss this issue extensively in Väyrynen (2012) . For some earlier work, see Hare (1952, 121-2; 1981, 17-18, 73-75) , Blackburn (1992) and Richard (2008, 32-33) . more general shapelessness phenomenon described in this paper. In this modest way my argument bears on the question of what terms or concepts count as evaluative in the first place.
